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ABSTRACT

Proceedings of a conference on policy issues pertinent to the design and implementation of teacher incentive plans are highlighted in this report. Seven papers and pursuant responses are presented, which include discussions on the definition and importance of teacher incentives, job redesign and its organizational impacts, constraint and variety perspectives, usefulness of "weak" initiatives, cost of teacher incentive plans, a model of differential incentives, and the teachers' point of view. Key elements of successful incentive programs include reduced professional isolationism, state financial support, local autonomy, teacher involvement, and public support, based on an immediate, comprehensive, flexible, and holistic plan for long-term professional development. (LMI)

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

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EA 022 620

CALL FOR TEACHER INCENTIVES

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR

INCENTIVES THAT ENHANCE THE TEACHING PROFESSION: A DISCUSSION OF THE POLICY ISSUES

Ann Thering, Editor

June 1987

One in a Series of Reports on
Attracting Excellence:
The Call for Teacher Incentives

NORTH CENTRAL REGIONAL
EDUCATIONAL LABORATORY

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Summary of the Proceedings of a Seminar
Incentives that Enhance the Teaching Profession:
A Discussion of the Policy Issues

Based on
An Invitational Conference Sponsored by NCREL
November 13-15, 1986

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Preface

How can the best and brightest among college students be encouraged to enter teacher preparation programs? What does it take to recognize, reward, and retain outstanding educators in elementary and secondary schools? Why do some educators invest more of themselves in developing their professional skills? The questions are myriad.

And as frequently as someone poses a question, another recommends an answer: introduce career ladders and mentoring systems; raise standards and salaries for entry into teaching; strengthen graduate and undergraduate programs of professional development; identify the most superior professionals with better tests and performance evaluation systems.

Debated and considered by policy makers, educators, scholars, and taxpayers, such questions and answers have been at the heart of educational reform initiatives nationwide for the past several years. And, in the same period, many innovative programs to provide incentives to educators have been introduced. Numerous states and local districts, including many in the region served by the North Central Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL), have considered or taken action to implement incentive policies and programs.

In response to considerable interest in the theme of incentives among constituents in the region, NCREL initiated activities to develop information resources and encourage related research early in 1986. The first activity involved reviewing relevant literature and developing a framework to guide future conceptual work and strategies. The framework first was employed to describe significant themes and issues apparent in policies and programs of state governments. Several papers regarding policy issues on incentive programs were presented and discussed at a seminar held in 1986.

In 1987, the focus of Laboratory activities began to shift from initiatives taken by states to programs in local school districts. A survey of districts in all seven states of the region and case studies to create profiles of a small number of district-level programs comprised the next phase of activity.

Many, many people have contributed to NCREL's work on the theme of incentives for teachers and other educators. Participants in the 1986 seminar, and authors and reviewers of various products have provided, sifted, considered, and translated what has become a significant pool of information.

Although all who have joined this effort have made important contributions, special credit is due to Dr. Carol Bartell of the University of Iowa's College of Education. Her interest in identifying difficult issues and promising programs was equalled only by her dedication to sharing what she was learning with educators, policy makers, and other scholars.

Art Dorman, Graduate Research Assistant at the University of Iowa, and Nancy Fulford, Program Associate at the Laboratory, also deserve special credit for contributing to the development of this product series.

NCREL is proud to publish this series of products.

Jane H. Arends
Executive Director

Harriet Doss Willis
Deputy Executive Director

Judson Hixson
Director, R&D Resource Development

Introduction and Key Elements (Carol Bartell and Nancy Fulford)

This report highlights the proceedings of an Invitational Conference sponsored by the North Central Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL) on November 13-15, 1986. The theme of this conference was Incentives that Enhance the Teaching Profession: A Discussion of the Policy Issues, and its purpose was to raise and discuss policy issues that must be considered in the design and implementation of teacher incentive plans. Implications for the seven-state NCREL region (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin) were particularly emphasized.

Educational leaders with diverse backgrounds and experiences were invited to participate in this conference, and each one offered a unique perspective to the discussion of the issues. The group size was intentionally kept small enough to facilitate meaningful discussion.

Seven papers were presented and seven reactors led the discussion of the issues presented in each paper. The first paper set the framework for the discussion. What do we mean by "incentives" and why has this become such an important concern at this particular time? Ann Hart, from her extensive research on the implications of career ladders in Utah, discussed the notion of job redesign and its organizational impacts. Gary Sykes explored the complexities of the incentives issue from two perspectives--a constraint perspective and a variety perspective. He also introduced the intriguing notion of "weak incentives" in teaching serving a useful function. In his discussion of the financial issues involved in incentive planning, Jim Ward raised the important question: Can we afford these plans that are being proposed? The members of the Collegial Research Consortium suggested that teachers are seeking different incentives at various stages in their careers and presented a model for consideration of this idea. Two different teachers' organization representatives, Damon Moore and Jacqueline Vaughn, addressed the issues from the teacher's point of view. What do teachers want and how can they be involved in policy determination on this issue?

The papers generated several important themes. Nancy Fulford found the following to be key elements in building successful incentive programs.

- The isolationism in the profession must be addressed and alleviated.
- State level support and financial assistance are necessary in order to implement change.
- Top-down or hierarchical control, and inflexible and mandatory regulation must be avoided.
- Local control should mean local authority, funding, and expertise to tailor the comprehensive incentives policy to building needs.
- Policy must be comprehensive rather than piecemeal.
- Programs must be well-designed and flexible with a wide range of options.
- Programs must be tailored to specific situations and individual needs.
- Comprehensive incentives policies must either include or encourage career-long professional development and incentives programs.
- Teacher involvement in the planning, development and implementation of programs and policy is essential at every level.
- Decisions at every level must consider the educational system as a whole and recognize that it is not isolated from political and economic factors.
- Much thought must be given to developing creative funding sources.
- Incentive policies must include horizontal as well as vertical programs.
- The public's attention must be captured and retained if long term change is to be nurtured, cultivated and funded.
- There is no time to waste.

The participants at this conference included the following:

Charles Almo	Chicago Public Schools
Jane Arends	North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
Elizabeth Ashburn	OERI (at the time of the Conference with American Association for Colleges of Teacher Education)
Naida Bagenstos	Southeastern Regional Council for Educational Improvement
Carol Bartell	The University of Iowa
Nelvia Brady	Chicago Community Trust
Judy Christensen	National College of Education

Albert Crusoe	Milwaukee Public Schools
Carol D'Amico	Indiana State Department of Education
Art Dorman	The University of Iowa
Ralph Fessler	The Johns Hopkins University
Nancy Fulford	North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
Arnold Gallegos	Western Michigan University
Ann Hart	University of Utah
Robert Hatfield	Michigan State University
Fred Hess	Chicago Panel on Public School Policy and Finance
Judson Hixson	North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
Babara Holmes	Education Commission of the States
Ken Howey	The Ohio State University
Louise Kutz	Ohio Education Association
Esther Letven	University of Wisconsin, Parkside
Kathryn Lind	Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction
Pearl Mack	National Education Association
John McDonnell	Beloit College
Richard Messenberg	Minnesota Department of Education
Damon Moore	Indiana State Teachers Association
Larry Murphy	Iowa Senate
Jay Price	University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point
Gary Sykes	Michigan State (at the time of the Conference with Stanford University)
Ann Thering	North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
Jacqueline Vaughn	Chicago Federation of Teachers
James Ward	University of Illinois
JaMille Webster	Michigan Education Association
Harriet Doss Willis	North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
Nancy Zimpher	The Ohio State University

A Reform Agenda: The Call for Teacher Incentives (Carol Bartell)

In order to improve the quality of education in this country, it is necessary to make the profession of teaching itself more attractive, respected and rewarding. Teacher incentives have been proposed as one way to make a contribution to the reform of education. A wide variety of incentive plans have been introduced in states and localities that have as their intent the enhancement of teaching as a profession.

Carol Bartell, Assistant Professor of Educational Administration at the University of Iowa, has designed a matrix to help match incentive motivators with intents. The intents are attraction, retention, improvement, and enhancement; the motivators are monetary compensation, career status, awards and recognition, professional responsibilities and conditions of the workplace.

Incentives serve to induce, motivate, and encourage participation or performance. For teachers, incentives should increase job satisfaction and promote increased effort toward higher achievement. Any incentive plan must consider factors which motivate teachers to enter and remain in the profession while continuing to develop their professional skills and competencies.

Bartell considers the intentions of incentives to be hierarchically arranged; incentives appeal with varying strengths at different stages of teachers' careers. So the intent of incentives should be based on what concerns need to be addressed. For example, if a school district has few qualified applicants for teaching positions, recruitment would be the immediate concern.

Usually, more than one motivator should be considered when building incentive plans. A wide range of motivations will predict and influence teacher behavior. The matrix should not, therefore, be used to fit a specific plan into an individual cell. Instead, it can be used to examine how each cell is addressed in a proposed incentive plan; the most comprehensive plans will address as many cells as possible.

On a national level, Bartell believes strong leadership is needed to reform the teaching profession. Funding research, demonstration projects and loan programs for prospective

teachers, and recognizing teachers are some ways to attract attention to reform. Much can be done at the state level as well. States can ensure equitable distribution of resources and examine how teachers are recruited and trained.

Local responsibilities for incentives undoubtedly will be crucial in determining whether or not a teacher is attracted to a particular job, remains working, and continues to exhibit professional growth. Efforts to initiate incentives at any level will fail unless steps are taken at the local level.

Themes for Reform

Bartell has summarized several themes which recur in various calls for reform:

- Teachers will be more rigorously trained, or more highly educated with a better knowledge of pedagogy and content areas.

- Teachers will have better knowledge and contribute more to the formation of school and educational goals, with a clear understanding of what they must contribute to achieve these goals.

- Status differences between teachers and administrators will be minimized.

- Schools will become less bureaucratic, with more decisions made at the local district and even the school site level.

- Teachers will work together more often to make decisions that affect them and their work.

- Schools will move away from perfunctory performance measures and toward meaningful evaluation and renewal for teachers and other school personnel.

- Teachers will exercise more control over professional matters and over the profession itself.

- Different teachers will assume different roles and responsibilities, making their careers more diverse.

- A strong emphasis will be placed on capacity building among educators rather than on control.

- Teachers will be paid a competitive, professional wage.

Response to Bartell: A Wisconsin Incentive Project (Kathryn Lind)

Kathryn Lind, Director of the Teaching Incentives Pilot Program for the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (WDPI), provides a look at the current status of teacher incentives in Wisconsin. Her discussion of the work of the Wisconsin Task Force on Teaching and Teacher Education supports Bartell's position that incentives should be based upon the specific needs to be addressed. Lind agrees that Bartell's matrix can be used as a guide, but not as a formula because a successful incentives package requires an individualized approach. Lind further agrees with Bartell that responsibility for incentives lies on national and state levels to provide leadership and financial support, but that reform has to happen at the local level.

The Wisconsin Task Force on Teaching and Teacher Education was formed to look at 1) attracting able men and women to the teaching profession; 2) preparing them adequately and appropriately to teach in elementary and secondary schools; and 3) retaining able, competent teachers and facilitating their continued professional development.

The Task Force recommended that a system of incentives be created to improve the quality and the appeal of the teaching profession. A Teaching Incentives Pilot Program was established in January 1984 to plan, develop, and implement a series of pilot projects which modeled different types of incentives for teachers. Several issues prompted the Task Force to develop an incentives program: nationally, teachers were less academically talented than students who choose most other college majors; academically able teachers tend to be the first to leave education; about 50% of teachers leave teaching within five years; and numbers of college freshmen planning to become elementary teachers has dropped in the last decade.

An Advisory Board composed of various education groups developed guidelines for a state incentives program. The Board recommended that the various education systems (universities, school districts, the state education agency) should participate in the program. Pilot project planning and action would be shared by teachers, administrators, school boards, and community members.

At regional information meetings held throughout Wisconsin to encourage districts to apply for grants to pilot an incentive project, WDPI staff soon noted a definite lack of enthusiasm on the part of teachers and some administrators. It seemed the need for incentives as identified by the state had insulted the integrity of experienced teachers. Teachers viewed the program as a "top down" initiative from the state department with the support of their local administrator. Teachers didn't agree that only the best were leaving or that the best were not attracted to the teaching profession.

From this pilot program, WDPI staff learned that local districts had to establish the need for an incentive program based on total agreement among teachers, district administrators, and school board and community members. Even so, many projects failed because the various factions could not agree on how to solve the problem. Lind says that it is crucial that individuals in charge of developing the incentive plan are respected and true spokespersons for their constituency.

The WDPI also discovered that the most predominant reasons districts developed incentives programs were based on teachers' sense of their loss of status in the profession and poor working conditions. The WDPI also found, contrary to common beliefs, that more academically able teachers are entering teaching, and enrollments in the school of education have actually increased in Wisconsin. Further, teachers are not leaving the profession in large numbers after five years.

Redesigning Careers for Current and Future Teachers (Ann Weaver Hart)

Ann Weaver Hart, Assistant Professor of Educational Administration at the University of Utah, believes job redesign literature is a good resource to use in analyzing teacher incentive policies. Hart performed a thorough review of redesign research and found several issues that she believes should be central to policy and research agendas. These issues include the effects of work redesign on school site interactions, district policies, principals' work, teacher career plans, and power distribution within schools.

- The tasks, autonomy, and feedback structures of work, modified by individual needs for growth, affect the motivating potential of a job. These structures might increase understanding of work isolation, or be used to assess new tasks, autonomous work, supervision, feedback to support the work, and a merit pay system requiring the assessment of individual teacher contributions to outcomes.

- Social cues affect how teachers assess the quality of work life and the motivating potential of their jobs. Social cues are the attitudes of significant others in the work place toward the redesigned work. Peers can influence attitudes in teacher job redesign efforts by accusing teachers in new roles of "exalting themselves above other teachers."

- Not all features of teacher incentive plans will appeal equally to all groups and individuals; features that some find attractive will repulse others. We must determine which incentives will attract non-teaching professionals to teaching. Teachers' needs will vary on the basis of their experiences, career stage, and personal career needs.

- Any assessment of a reform plan must look at interaction patterns at each school. Additionally, small incremental changes, often adjustments meant only to make people more comfortable, can neutralize the effects of job redesign, reverting back to familiar practice.

- Teacher participation in the redesign of work is not considered a uniformly strong influence on long range attitudes about work redesign efforts. Participation should

not be ignored, but other factors such as altered supervisory behavior may be more powerful influences on long term responses to incentives.

- Any redesign of teaching work will fundamentally alter teacher/principal authority and decision-making relationships. Principals would serve a far different role in schools--as heads of school leadership teams, as group leaders, or as articulators. Some principals will find this threatening, while others may find it invigorating. Role ambiguity and overload can cause work stress for teachers and principals.

- Resources are critical to the workplace, but some researchers believe available resources could be reorganized and redistributed to enhance attractiveness of the work structure and increase teacher career growth opportunities.

- Any redesign of teaching work will place serious strains on the evaluation technology and structure, and on employment/promotion decisions.

How job redesign contributes to school-wide effectiveness will be difficult to assess for a long time according to Hart. Job redesign's intermediate effects on such items as career plans of teachers, the appeal of reform features to young people entering the work force, the retention rates of selected groups of teachers, and the accomplishment of school tasks will be easier to assess. Such assessment should begin immediately upon implementation. Stamina, in the form of leadership, articulation, and resolve, is needed to successfully redesign teaching. If teachers think the job redesign movement is destined to fizzle out, they might not invest serious effort into adjusting.

Response to Hart (Robert Hatfield)

Job redesign literature can provide data on how to reach teacher incentive goals. Robert Hatfield, Professor of Teacher Education at Michigan State University, thinks that Ann Hart's review has flushed out several elements integral to successful design and implementation of job changes, but suggests the need to interpret this literature in the context of current programs. He believes the variables identified in these studies should be used to actually design a teacher's role. Hatfield also dicusses issues which he believes need further clarification and asks several key questions related to job redesign.

Career ladder research shows that teachers haven't been enthused about accepting the added responsibilities which go with most steps up the ladder. Experienced teachers aren't eager to accept help from an appointed master teacher. Merit pay systems promote increased competitiveness and less cooperation and emphasis on school goals. Hatfield believes that issues of efficacy motivate teachers more than money. For instance, teachers need better professional preparation and peer interaction. Variety, too, should be a mainstay of career ladders and mentor teachers. However, efforts at role redefinition must take into account negative reactions to perceived status change and negation of aspects teachers value.

To some extent, current practice pays some attention to autonomy and feedback as motivational factors, but jobs should be designed in a manner which considers both the task and the motivational effects. Teaching alone cannot be considered motivational enough.

Implementation Factors to Consider

Job redesign studies call for careful planning and include elements for responses to new roles, task interdependence, participation, attitudes of significant others, and situational constraints. Personal and group responses to new roles are strong factors influencing change. Because each response will be different, plans must allow for these differences, unlike current career ladders and mentor plans which ignore them. Task interdependence can lead to confusion on the issues of autonomy and collegiality. Task design studies call for involvement in planning changes. The effectiveness of new roles

depends on having the necessary authority. New relationships require organizational support, competence to provide new skills, and clear communications with supervisors.

Situational constraints, which include related history, relationships, and resources linked to the development of an innovation also must be considered. Task design needs to be institutionally specific when addressing personnel needs, individual perceptions and responses to change, and supplies.

Hatfield describes several concepts which give more direction for improving any type of teacher incentive program.

Issues Needing Further Clarification

Hatfield believes that several issues that Hart brings up need more work. These include:

- Will teachers' roles be changed through specialized tasks, somewhat like earlier attempts (counselor, special education teacher, librarian)? These specializations have not been seen as career advancement.

- How do programs for career differentiation affect the organizational culture of schools? Right now, the literature shows people are trying to enhance teacher incentives within this culture. Personnel evaluation is linked to an organization's culture and work environment. Evaluation in present teacher incentive programs leans more heavily in the direction of increased competition and personal goal achievement rather than increased collegiality and communication.

- How much precision is needed to evaluate how to distribute incentives? The organizational structure which would result from such an evaluation will affect the entire work force and might not be consistent with the needs of the professional worker. Describing tasks, necessary resources and power distribution need to be articulated and compatible to make job redesign work. Appraisals are not always based on school goals, so do not necessarily lead to school improvement. A close link exists between the issues for implementing changes in tasks and the

organizational culture studies. In job redesign studies, the issues seem less visible and comprehensive.

Key Questions

Hatfield believes that applying job redesign literature to teacher incentive plans could lead to improved teacher performance, but says several questions need to be answered.

- Where and how should job redesign concepts be used to create teacher incentive plans?

- Do career ladders and mentor teachers create new jobs?. At present, these new roles sometimes conflict with other leadership roles. Right now, teacher leaders are serving both formal and informal roles (more than 10 percent of the teaching force). These roles need to be reviewed and redesigned to clarify differences in responsibility as perceived by self, peers, and administrators. Communication is often poor among individuals responsible for curriculum development and for staff development. This communication gap stems as much from organizational structure and authority as personal conflicts and should be an important factor in designing new roles.

- How are various educational constituencies going to participate and contribute to building new teaching roles?

Teaching Incentives: Constraint and Variety (Gary Sykes)

Most of the literature on incentives splits between constraints and variety. To develop proper incentives for teachers, Gary Sykes, Assistant Professor in the Teacher Education Department at Michigan State University and formerly at Stanford University, says we must understand constraints (systemic features of teaching that are difficult to change), as well as variety (both good practice and bad) within teaching. Sykes reviews the evidence and arguments for each perspective, and takes up the question of whether teaching's weak incentives may serve several adaptive functions. He concludes with suggestions for further lines of research in teaching incentives.

Some Constraints

- A powerful source of motivation in many organizations, the opportunity for clients to switch brands, is virtually absent in education.

- Private schools attract people with deep commitments to particular religious ideals and traditions, despite lower salaries and fewer resources than most public schools. Public school teachers may live out a service ideal, but they work in a large, impersonal, and secular environment which can gradually sap commitment.

- Incentives in teaching are relatively weak.

- Although most teachers downplay the importance of monetary rewards, some are unhappy about the current level of their compensation. In addition, teachers are uncertain of how effective they are because of vague assessment criteria. Teacher status is not what it should be. Teachers control neither the conditions nor the resources of work. Teaching careers have few rewards. Teachers protect their autonomy in the classroom at the expense of colleagueship and professional community.

With all these constraints, it's no wonder that some teachers think their return on time and effort devoted to teaching doesn't warrant the investment. Over the years, teachers have compensated for weak rewards. Sykes says these accommodations themselves have

since become sturdy features of teaching, highly resistant to change. Job security in exchange for better pay and status, is one such accommodation.

Many proposals to alter fundamental aspects of teaching--career ladders, merit pay, peer evaluation, team teaching--meet with resistance because many teachers have adapted to the constraints currently in place and do not feel that it would be worthwhile to make changes.

Functions of Weak Incentives

Teaching's weak incentives are deeply rooted in structural constraints. The persistence of weak incentives simultaneously represents the conditions of teaching and adaptations to those conditions. Several researchers have looked into the implications for what role weak incentives have in teaching. Sykes compiled the following list of implications.

- Weak incentives support the service ideal in teaching.

- Weak incentives lower standards, encouraging teachers to adjust perceptions of what they can accomplish to the realities of teaching. How can they be expected to accomplish so much if the rewards are so few?

- Weak incentives promote turnover. Teaching is emotionally demanding; few people can teach for years without encountering burn-out. Also, if all teachers taught 40 years, costs would be significantly higher.

- Weak incentives induce low commitment and free teachers to engage in a variety of activities.

- Control of work at schools is weak, permitting work to be done according to local judgments.

Sykes says arguments for weak incentives are very speculative, but they do illustrate that weak incentives may have come to serve adaptive functions. This does not mean they are desirable.

Variety in Schools

School and district-level characteristics influence the satisfaction of teaching. For instance, salary and working conditions influence recruitment, retention, mobility, and job satisfaction in teaching. Salary is the most direct policy variable to manipulate to attract teachers. Teacher supply is positively related to salary levels in teaching and negatively related to salaries in other occupations. Wage differentials affect teacher mobility between districts and contribute to teachers' decisions to leave teaching. Racially isolated inner city schools have particular difficulty attracting and retaining teachers.

Teachers may trade salary for other benefits such as small class sizes, motivated students, and pleasant surroundings. Many other subtle factors involving strategy, structures, systems, style, skill, and superordinate goals, combine to produce work settings that motivate and direct teacher work.

In schools that support teachers, research has found that goal setting and developing a consensus on values result from frequent communication among faculty, teachers' observation of each other, frequent learning opportunities for teachers, and principals who foster goal consensus. The teachers at such schools gain confidence in their ability to produce academic achievement, believe that learning to teach takes a long time, emphasize individual learning differences among children, believe teaching is a collective endeavor, and are more willing to "buck the system."

Research has shown that these collaborative schools have lower teacher absentee rates and produce higher standardized test scores than non-collaborative schools. Research has also found that the following practices enhance adaptability:

- Teachers talk about teaching practice often.
- Teachers are frequently observed and critiqued.
- Teachers plan, design, research and evaluate and prepare teaching materials together.

- Teachers teach each other the practice of teaching.

- Organizational structures and processes encourage and insist on such behavior.

This research fits well with many generalizations from the effective schools literature, which emphasizes consensus among faculty on goals, evaluation mechanisms in place, etc. Teachers feel rewarded for their work in such schools.

Recommendations for Further Research

Incentives and School Effectiveness Sykes' extensive literature review emphasizes that cultural characteristics of schools contribute to schooling outcomes directly and through effects on teaching's intrinsic rewards. Sykes says that these characteristics are alterable and that more research is needed in this area. Research must look at differences among elementary, middle, and secondary schools and should view schools in a community context. More information is needed about how responding to the community affects school effectiveness. Differences among similar schools that are effective should be identified to show no single formula underlies good schools.

Relationship between accountability and teaching incentives Single-minded emphasis on accountability isn't likely to inspire teachers. Direction without support, and support without direction must be avoided. The effects of accountability and control procedures on teacher's motivation, morale, and effectiveness must be considered.

Equity Implications of Incentives The current system is inequitable between states and districts, within states, and often between schools within districts. Research should look at distribution and redistribution of incentives.

Response to Sykes (Elizabeth Ashburn)

Elizabeth A. Ashburn, Senior Research Associate at OERI and formerly with AACTE, supports Sykes' idea of looking for successful examples of incentives to use as models. While research usually points to the mean, Sykes suggests that we look at the exception to use as a model in the development of policy and programs. Ashburn discusses several other areas of agreement, some areas of concern, and finally lists several key questions educators should consider.

Ashburn agrees that educators need to pay more attention to private sector incentives and accompanying research, but is concerned that comparing education to the private sector may be taken too far. She says that education's bottom line is not profit or productivity in the usual business sense.

Weak incentives serve major functions in the social and organizational structure of education as Sykes indicated. Ashburn questions whether strong incentives are really going to solve problems.

When teachers are in very controlling environments, Ashburn agrees with Sykes that they control their students more. For example, these teachers allow students to work alone less and spend twice as much time lecturing. More discussion is needed about what role teachers will play in developing and implementing incentives.

And finally, Ashburn supports Sykes' view that teachers' work reflects their environment; their perceived expectancy of obtaining valued outcomes through their own efforts can increase based on what organizational variables exist. Job satisfaction increases with job confidence. How knowledge about teacher efficacy informs the development of policy and procedures for teacher incentives must be addressed.

- **Concerns**

Several of Sykes' arguments, however, cause concern for Ashburn. For instance, she doesn't think educators should treat educational reform as a national event, because not all schools are in bad shape. Reform should begin on a local level, which does not mean that policy has to be piecemeal.

Ashburn is also concerned that educators do not consider the variety of schools from community to community. She believes that educators should discuss questions and assumptions held about goals in the schools.

Sykes' suggestion to look at all the options and experiments disregards that the subjects are not laboratory animals, according to Ashburn. She would like values and assumptions expressed in the policy making process.

Key Questions

Ashburn thinks educators and policymakers should ask themselves the following questions.

- Why is it assumed that people don't want to work, don't want to improve or do their jobs well?

- How can the fundamental tenet that reform is local be incorporated into policymaking? Policy needs to consider that what is happening can be found in a local setting.

- How can policy and conduct inquiry be made so that teachers are involved? Teachers should be involved in research concerning the impact of policy.

- What assumptions, variables and dynamics need attention? Ashburn would like to see the actual framework for thinking about the meaning of incentives, their use, and related issues. Given the constraints, variations, and weak but purposeful incentives, what should be done next?

Financial Issues and Fiscal Responsibilities for Teacher Incentive Plans (James G. Ward)

Most approaches to teacher incentives are very expensive, have vague goals, and are not cost-effective according to James G. Ward, Assistant Professor of Educational Administration at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. He addresses the fiscal and demographic environments for teacher incentives, focusing on the states in NCREL's region. Ward contends that successfully implementing teacher incentive plans depends upon environmental factors mostly outside policymakers and administrators' control, and discusses how fiscal factors and funding will threaten such programs. Ward says at least half of the funding for such programs must come from state governments because property tax burdens in the U.S. are already high.

To increase student achievement, Ward believes we must concentrate on basic services. From a school finance and resource allocation perspective, the teacher is a key element to focus upon because the costs of teacher salaries and benefits are the largest item in the school budget. According to a survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Education, almost one fifth of public school districts in the U.S. used some type of teacher incentive, with financial incentives as the most common type. Ward says it's not clear whether these teacher incentives have achieved their purpose or how much they cost, and he calls for cost benefit or cost-effective studies.

Ward next explains several impediments to implementing incentive programs. One is allowing incentives to slide off the policy agenda. After a policy issue has received widespread recognition, public interest often wanes, pushing the issue into prolonged limbo. Another danger to incentives is the manner in which they are implemented, top down, bureaucratic fashion, or bottom-up. Ward thinks that both approaches are likely to fail, and calls for leadership that respects teachers as professionals while still motivating substantial improvement.

Ward says that a successful incentive plan must have clear goals and show exactly how it will improve school quality, or at least suggest how to evaluate its effects on school quality. Incentive plans must be part of a structural change in the education system and should consider everyone's interests and needs. In addition, an incentive plan must be affordable.

Costs of Teacher Incentives

In 1979-80, expenditure levels per pupil for five of seven Midwestern states were above the national average, but the recession and a major agricultural crisis dropped these spending levels by 1985-86. The percentage increase in per pupil expenditures between 1979-80 and 1985-86 exceeded the national average increase only in Ohio and Wisconsin.

In 1979-80, average teacher salaries in Michigan and Illinois were at least 10 percent above national average, while salaries in Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa were below the national average and remained below in 1985-86. Wisconsin and Michigan increased salaries relative to the national average between 1979-80 and 1985-86. Despite these increases, overall, the Midwestern states are moving closer to the norm in spending levels.

Enrollment is also dropping. Between 1979-80 and 1985-86, public school enrollment in the U.S. dropped 5.5 percent, while declines in all seven Midwestern states exceeded 10 percent. During the same time, the percentage decline of classroom teachers exceeded the national average in all seven states. Overall, the level of per pupil expenditures, classroom teacher salaries, enrollment, and the number of teachers indicates that Midwestern public schools aren't as fiscally healthy as the rest of the nation. In addition, economic forecasts suggest slow economic growth for the nation.

A look at the national picture shows that it would cost $24 to $26 billion (20 percent of current total national expenditures in public elementary and secondary schools) to upgrade teacher quality and the curriculum, and to lengthen the school year. To upgrade teacher quality alone would cost $13 to $16 billion nationally. In 1985-86, the national average classroom teacher salary was $25,257. Raising salaries to $35,000 per year would cost more than $21 billion in the first year alone (using 1985-86 data), equivalent to a 15.7 percent increase in school budget (not including fringe benefits). Once again, Ward points out that the big problem with these high costs is the lack of evidence that these reforms would improve education to a substantial degree.

Costs of Master Teacher Plans

Master teacher plans vary greatly, so estimates of their costs are very rough. Ward's estimate of the total national cost for the first year of a master teacher plan is $10.5 billion (including salary and fringe benefits). Increased costs for states to implement a master teacher plan range from $187 million in Iowa to $604 million in Illinois. Other teacher incentive programs, such as loan subsidy programs, awards and recognition, are impossible to cost out with any accuracy, according to Ward.

Response to Ward (G. Alfred Hess)

G. Alfred Hess, Jr., Executive Director of the Chicago Panel on Public School Policy and Finance, responded to James Wards' presentation. Hess discusses the accuracy and usefulness of Ward's cost analysis of two different incentive plans. He agrees with Ward that funds probably will not be available for any new public education programs, and offers several alternative incentives.

Ward's detailed cost descriptions do not assess whether benefits exceed the costs, nor do they determine which program is more effective. Hess suggests that comparative analysis of utility or effectiveness could be used to evaluate different incentive plans, although he admits that such analysis can be difficult to accomplish when the proposals under consideration are supposedly aimed at different objectives.

Ward correctly points out that growth in education funding in the Midwest has not kept pace with the national average. In Illinois, Hess calculated that state education funding didn't even keep pace with inflation from 1977 to 1983, and in 1982-83, educational funding was cut from the level of the preceding year. Taking declining enrollments into account, per pupil state support fell by 29 percent in real terms between 1977 and 1983 in Illinois. In addition, Hess confirms the accuracy of Ward's figures which estimate the costs for raising Illinois teacher salaries to $35,000. Ward's estimate of a Tennessee type Master Teacher Plan for Illinois, however, is twice as much as Hess's.

Because of a lack of specific proposals in circulation, Ward does not provide data on what other incentive plans would cost. Hess examines proposals for teacher training scholarships, retraining scholarships, and internships. Even figuring internships for 10 percent of new hires in Illinois, costs came only to $3 million for half-year internships. These kinds of costs may be politically feasible.

Alternative Incentives

Although the distinct problems of school improvement and school stability could be addressed by increasing teacher salaries, other solutions may exist as well. One

alternative incentive is to set aside education course requirements and open teaching to the large pool of unemployed or underemployed college graduates. While repugnant to the education establishment, Hess believes this may be the cheapest way to recruit new teachers and improve the basic academic capacity of entering teachers. Some indoctrination courses could be required.

Another approach is setting higher criteria for college students majoring in education. This strategy may raise test scores, but would also restrict the number of people entering teaching. Tougher standards without making salaries competitive is unlikely to provide enough teachers to meet even current replacement needs.

Ward dismisses class size reductions as a possible incentive because of its high cost. Yet, Indiana cut class size in the primary grades to 18 while Florida reduced English class sizes by 20 percent.

Ward echoes calls in popular literature for promotion, professional growth, and career advancement opportunities. Hess wonders if teacher advancement will cause school systems to lose their most effective teachers in return for moderately to minimally effective administrators. Hess also points out that while teachers claim professional status, most other professionals have no promotion options. Teachers are also unionists; most union members work in fields without promotion.

In Hess's opinion, proponents of career ladders must compare career with management jobs which have a clear sense of climbing the corporate, bureaucratic ladder. For teachers to advance, they have to leave teaching and get into management.

Hess also suggests disaggregating educational approaches, at least to differentiating among suburban, urban, and exurban districts. He sees little need for teacher incentives in most existing suburban areas. On the other hand, how to get the best teachers to work in schools which need the most help is a very important incentive question. Perhaps teachers should be paid more for working in inner-cities. Exurban districts have a whole different set of issues, with lower pay scales to start but the attractiveness of a downscale life style.

Incentives and Teachers' Career Stages: Influences and Policy Implications (John H. McDonnell, Judith Christensen, Jay Price; also contributing: Peter Burke and Ralph Fessler)

The members of the Collegial Research Consortium, Ltd: John H. McDonnell, professor of Education at Beloit College, Wisconsin; Judith Christensen, Director of MAT program at National College of Education, Evanston, Illinois, Jay Price, Associate Professor of Education, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point; Peter Burke, Section Chief, Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction; Ralph Fessler, Director of The Division of Education John Hopkins University, think a new structure for the teaching profession should be developed. Their model predicts that at various career stages, teachers will perceive different personal and organizational influences as important, and therefore perceive incentives differently as well. Teacher incentives should provide flexibility based on career stages and alternatives which reflect potential teacher stage cycles as influenced by personal and school environment.

Most people agree that both entry levels and top levels of most salary schedules are inadequate for competent teachers. On a national level, math, science, and some special education teachers are in short supply. In the Sunbelt states, there is a teacher shortage period. The number of school age children is increasing while the number of students choosing teaching as a career has shrunk 50 percent since 1972. About 50 percent of teachers leave the profession after five years. Some evidence shows that those who drop out are among the more competent.

Teaching has a flat career line, with the first year novice and 40-year veteran performing essentially the same tasks. Teachers often top out on the salary schedule when they reach 35 or 40 years of age. The only way for teachers to increase their salary or status is to leave teaching and move into administration. Teachers have little control over the actual conditions in their work environment. This alienates some teachers from the work place. They resent their lack of automomy and control, and the absence of leadership in their school.

Educators spend lots of money figuring out the individual needs of students; teachers deserve the same consideration. Most researchers agree that stages of development are important when planning effective professional incentives and development programs. How can incentives be tailored to meet these needs? Right now, no research base exists to verify the various stages of teacher development; there aren't many procedures for assessing stages of teachers' careers. Needs assessment is geared more toward involving teachers in identifying their own needs.

Teacher Career Cycle Model

This model offers a view of career progression which reflects influences from both the personal and organizational environment. The personal environment includes family support structures, life crises, individual dispositions, avocational outlets, and developmental life stages experienced by teachers. Personal environments may become the driving force in influencing job behavior and the career cycle. Positive nurturing and reinforcing support from the personal environment will likely favorably affect the career cycle, if they don't conflict with career-related responsibilities.

The organizational environment includes school regulations, management style of administrators and supervisors, atmosphere of public trust present in a community, expectations a community places upon its educational system, activities of professional organizations, and the union atmosphere present in the system. If supportive, this environment will reinforce, reward and encourage teachers as they progress through their career cycle. A mistrustful and suspicious atmosphere will probably have a negative impact.

Components of Career Cycle

- Preservice -- preparation in school, retraining in inservice or coursework.
- Induction -- first few years of employment.
- Competency Building -- teachers improve skills.
- Enthusiastic and growing -- after achieving high level of competence, it is continuous.

- Career frustration -- often in mid-career or earlier, disillusionment.

- Stable and stagnant -- do what is expected, but no more.

- Career wind down -- preparing to leave, can be bitter or pleasant.

- Career exit -- time after teacher leaves teaching, retirement.

Survey Results

Researchers performed two surveys to assess teachers' career stages and to examine appropriate and available incentives to meet needs at each stage. In one survey, respondents chose one descriptive paragraph which best described their current career stage. Another survey examined the relationship between career stages and incentives, based on incentives for growth. Respondents indicated availability and appropriateness of each incentive for themselves.

From the survey results the researchers concluded that career stages should be linked with appropriate incentives. Further, staff development program delivery techniques should be linked to incentives and to career stages. It is important to know which teachers react positively to praise and support, which need concrete incentives, which respond to money and security only. A careful analysis must be made of the availability of specific incentives at each career stage to meet more fully the needs of teachers. No matter how many years a person has been teaching, he or she deserves personal attention. The study also indicated that the number of years in education or in a position does not distinguish the different career stages. This plateau effect after several years has been described in employees in other occupations, and is apparently related to a decrease or increase in effective performance.

Policymakers must develop models which advocate personalized support. They should pay particular attention to beginning teachers; these teachers have positive attitudes but also have many needs. The concept of staff development and professional growth must be broadened to include support systems to help teachers deal with family problems, substance abuse, retirement issues, and so on.

The Consortium concludes that career lattice structures allow teachers to move in and out of various roles, depending on each teacher's needs. Lattices minimize competition, and highlight collegiality. Policy makers should strive to individualize professional development and incentives for teachers. Although politically expedient, in and of themselves career ladders may not transform teaching into a more professionalized job -- a career lattice could do just that.

Reactions to the Collegial Research Consortium (Arnold M. Gallegos)

Arnold M. Gallegos, Dean of the College of Education at Western Michigan University and President of the Teacher Education Council of State Colleges and Universities, agrees with the Collegial Research Consortium's assertion that identifiable career stages for teachers exist and incentives should be tailored to coincide with these career stages. But he thinks the Consortium's major omission is the absence of analysis and synthesis of incentives that focus on group rather individual needs. Gallegos says research has shown that competitive rewards for individuals may be less effective in motivating teachers than rewards targeted at a group working together toward school and professional goals. A lattice may mitigate competition that career ladders fostered, but its greatest contribution will probably be to produce inexpensive incentives for school districts that can't afford to raise salaries.

Gallegos points out other omissions as well. For instance, the model under which the Consortium bases its work points to the teacher as the key factor in school improvement and thus calls for increasing the accountability for teachers. This premise contributes to a limited mind-set about the purposes of schooling, making it harder to keep good teachers; the Consortium doesn't address this problem.

He also challenges the claim that teachers who drop out are among the most competent. A 1985, Louis Harris survey, showed that the least qualified leave at similar rates because of job stress, dissatisfaction with teaching, lack of intellectual challenge, etc. The Consortium doesn't address these problems nor identify incentives to solve them.

Gallegos appreciates that the Consortium widened the scope of professional development to include personal needs as well as professional; these problems are often overlooked.

He says logic would indicate group based incentives would be far more effective, less expensive, and results more longlasting than competitive, individual incentives. The incentives listed in the Consortium's second survey were geared toward individual, rather than group incentives, and so were too unidimensional and self serving.

Another problem Gallegos found was that the Consortium ignores different mental sets that teachers have. For example, secondary teachers consider themselves as content specialists, whereas primary teachers facilitate learning for students in several subject areas. Effective incentives for secondary teachers will probably differ considerably from those for primary.

The Teacher's Role in Policy Decision-Making (Damon Moore)

Until the teacher is given a meaningful role in the educational decision-making process, public education cannot be improved, according to Damon Moore, President of the Indiana State Teachers Association. Moore thinks there is widespread concern about making the system better, but finds that reports are focusing on the teacher instead of the system itself. He also dicusses how Indiana has involved teachers in decision-making.

Typically, school administrators respond to the issue of teacher participation in policy decision-making in one of two ways: they claim that teachers already have too much to do, and so shouldn't become involved, or they feel threatened because they think teacher involvement will sap its decision-making authority.

Teachers should be given a greater role in the goal setting process for several reasons. Research from the private sector tells us that shared decision-making and employee investment in setting goals and making policies pays off in profits and morale. In addition, teachers hold the most accurate information on the educational process. In particular, teachers should be involved in goal-setting, decisions concerning the work process in schools, and in decisions governing resource use and allocation.

What do teachers think about becoming involved? A 1986 survey found that teachers do not think they have the opportunity to bring their professional expertise to bear in decision making, and that communication between building level administrators and teachers is less frequent than desired. The cost of excluding teachers from all decisions can be high for this exclusion contributes to teachers' sense of powerlessness, which in turn can lead to career dissatisfaction.

In order to increase career satisfaction, Moore calls for a comprehensive rather than piecemeal policy-making structures to involving teachers in decision making. For example, Moore doesn't think longer school days or school years, or more money is as important to teachers as giving them the authority to make decisions.

Additionally, Moore says merit pay projects have demonstrated themselves to be inefficient for they create a cost system which divides educators prompting them to fight amongst themselves.

Indiana Involves Teachers

In Indiana, a collective bargaining law offers a prime example of how teachers can be involved in decision-making. This law offers teachers and school boards the right to be involved in a bilateral decision-making process that gives each party an equal role, unlike other programs designed to give employees a feeling of involvement while decision-making authority actually rests in the hands of administrators. Teachers and school board members discuss several topics including: working conditions, curriculum development and revision, textbook selection, teaching methods, selection and assignment of personnel, promotion of personnel, pupil teacher ratio, class size, and budget appropriations.

Reactions to Moore (Barbara J. Holmes)

Barbara J. Holmes, with ECS, basically agrees with Damon Moore that teachers should have the power to make educational decisions and that communication among teachers and communication among teachers and administrators needs to be improved. However, Holmes does not respond to many of Moore's positions. She does respond to his call for structural change by discussing the notion that colleges of education may play an active role in changing teacher roles and lists several ways in which these colleges could accomplish this.

According to Holmes, colleges of education can and should be leaders in improving the teaching force. If colleges of education had provided evidence of higher performance in the past, state policy makers may not have mandated accountability and set standards. Holmes notes that state mandates and reports by associations don't actually address the practices that teachers have control over, and as is usually the case with change mandated from above, are often hard to implement.

To date, colleges of education have been somewhat slow to help formulate professional standards and design evaluation measures of teacher performance, although many single instances of exemplary programs exist. Holmes lists several tasks colleges of education should perform to help change teacher roles.

- Strive to improve work and employment conditions. For example, colleges could help new teachers feel connected to a larger whole of professional interests by adding interns to the staff. Aides and interns could also serve to increase intellectual stimulation in the work environment, as would allowing people from a variety of professions to teach on a temporary and part-time basis.

- Design programs to prepare school administrators. Instead of elevating teachers to principal positions, colleges of education should offer two separate programs, one for teachers, and one for principals.

- Create links between schools and colleges of education. Today, clusters of institutions within states are collaborating to accomplish common goals. Colleges of education should highlight these collaborations to enable other schools to replicate them.

- Help to develop multicultural awareness programs. The curriculum of such programs should enhance understanding of cultural diversity and similarity; the program's clinical experiences should be situated in a variety of neighborhoods and communities.

The Role of Teacher Unions in the Development and Implementation of Incentive Programs (Jacqueline Vaughn)

Jacqueline Vaughn, President of the Chicago Teachers Union, AFT, Local 1, believes that educational reform has led to a new role for teacher organizations involved in collective bargaining with local school districts. She describes what this role should be in the search for the right educational incentives through her discussion of two projects: The Teacher Recruitment/Internship Program and the Critical Thinking Program.

In part, these projects are based on an AFT Task Force recommendation that educational reform should consider demographic and structural changes affecting societal needs of teachers and of the nation. The way to do this, according to AFT, is to restore professionalism to teaching, restructure public schools, promote student learning, and find new ways to attract talent to teaching. Research shows that money alone is not a strong enough incentive, nor are career ladders without adequate training. Teachers, according to Vaughn, must be involved in collaborative planning and decision-making.

To develop an effective incentive program for a teacher internship project, the Chicago Teachers Union, AFT, Local 1, is in the process of collective bargaining with the Chicago Board of Education. This program involves recruiting new teachers, and identifying motivational incentives for consulting educators who volunteer to assist troubled teachers. This Teacher Recruitment/Internship program offers experienced teachers new career opportunities without leaving teaching and gives newcomers a chance to try teaching through a supervised internship and access to practical, research based seminars.

This project is part of a $114,000 joint venture between AFT and the American Can Company Foundation, targeted to seven large school systems. This particular project requires collaboration among The Chicago Public Schools, the Chicago Teachers Union, and the University of Illinois-Chicago to design and implement the recruitment effort to attract academically talented to teaching. NCREL and a consultant from the University of Wisconsin are assisting with this project.

This program would enable schools to maintain a strong teaching force by offering the mentor position as a career opportunity for effective, experienced, knowledgeable classroom teachers. (These mentors would be released of teaching duties on a part-time basis only.) The program alters teacher preparation programs to encourage the interaction of practical, useful knowledge with an understanding of subject matter and educational issues.

The intern would be offered several incentives: the chance to try teaching, a supervised internship, a chance to receive a teaching certificate without having to invest a sizable portion of undergraduate study, and an opportunity to receive a fellowship to attend graduate or professional school in return for teaching one or two years beyond the internship.

Partner Roles

Each partner in the teacher recruitment/internship project would have specific roles to perform, according to Vaughn. In the initial steps, union leaders who work on school improvement/staff development must play a key role. Union tasks include initiating the program, gaining collaborative partners, assuring teacher involvement, gaining state or board approved funding, and planning evaluation designs. When planning gets to specifics, unions must involve classroom teachers who will serve as mentors.

Local school district representatives also have responsibilities, which include gaining project approval from the school board and working with partners to identify recruitment priorities.

The University develops certification programs with partners and ways to involve mentor teachers as faculty colleagues. Vaughn says both officials from the education school and those with university wide responsibilities must become involved.

To receive statewide support for internships and mentors, Vaughn stresses the importance of involving members of the state legislature to guide legislative strategies and or seek necessary changes or waivers in regulation.

Critical Thinking Project

The Chicago Teachers Union and Chicago Board of Education are collaborating in another joint venture in the Chicago Public Schools: the Critical Thinking project. The AFT assisted both the Union and the Board to develop the project's basic components and attain funding. For the project 30 classroom teachers were selected to be trained in the Fall 1986. The AFT and CTU paid for training. Teachers were reimbursed for their time, and received credit. The Board of Education provided substitute teachers as needed, and a periodic review of effectiveness was conducted by CTU and CBE.

Reactions to Vaughn (Ralph Fessler)

Jacqueline Vaughn described specific projects being supported by the Chicago Teachers Union. Ralph Fessler, Professor of Education and Director of the Division of Education, at John Hopkins University, thinks that Vaughn offers some interesting approaches to teacher incentives. He reviews these projects and discusses the significance of the expanding agenda for collective bargaining. Fessler argues that Vaughn should not present teachers becoming involved in decision-making as a new idea, for it is not in his mind.

In brief, Fessler reviews the Chicago Teachers Union projects. The teacher recruitment/internship program provides assistance for beginning teachers through a supervised internship support seminars, and financial assistance. Practicing teachers serve as mentors for interns and receive monetary compensation and recognition of their expertise and importance in the educational process. The Critical Thinking Skills Project provides recognition to teachers and involves them in decision-making about their professional development activities.

These projects both assume that teachers are professionals and should be involved in decisions that affect them. Fessler says that this idea is well supported by the literature and should not be treated as a new concept. It is new that teacher unions recognize that the collective bargaining agenda must be broadened beyond monetary incentives. While rewards remain important, unions recognize that they are not sufficient, that teacher moral and performance are influenced by teachers being involved in decisions related to curriculum, instruction, and other everyday areas. Research has shown that monetary incentives will not stimulate workers to go beyond "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay." Higher level needs must be addressed in addition to money if the system is to be affected.

Fessler suggests that the lack of teacher participation in decision-making is related to the adversarial relationship that often exists between teacher unions and management. Problems facing teaching can't be solved if this relationship between teacher unions and management remains the accepted mode of operation.

In addition, Fessler warns that we must be careful not to assume that involvement of teacher unions takes care of the need for teacher participation in the decision-making process. Although the literature shows teachers must be active participants in decisions that affect them, it is appropriate for teacher unions to represent teachers in negotiating the right of participation.

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